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Abstract 
This paper deals with the social production of knowledge in the exact sciences. 
After defining  the term, exact science, it delineates the broad dynamic of its 
history. It, then, offers a socio-economic historical explanation of why the 
production of knowledge has become a major industry, if not the largest 
industry, in the last hundred years. The paper concludes by drawing a detailed 
blueprint of the components, mechanisms and specificities of the knowledge 
industry. 
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Introduction 
Knowledge is an amazing human power. It is almost a divine attribute 
of man, a divine flash of light, a sacred divine fire, stolen by 
Prometheus to grace man with it. It is of course a real power-- nay, 
the basis of all human powers. It is multifaceted and basically 
abstract, which makes its study a particularly complicated, hard and 
multifaceted enterprise. Since discursive knowledge is a distinctive 
human attribute, which distinguishes man from other living 
organisms, we know that it must be related to the complexity of the 
human brain and its interactive abilities with nature and society. But, 
how? Where does it emanate from? How is it born, and how does it 
persist? Our starting point in this work is the historical observation 
that knowledge is not meta-human, that it is not pre-existent, and, 
thus, that it is not merely a process of recollection or inspiration. 
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Rather, it is socially produced. There is no innate, eternal knowledge 
pre-existing in the human mind or elsewhere, as in Plato and to a 
certain extent in Descartes, or in some divinely written eternal text, as 
in religion, or in the human heart, as in mystics. Knowledge is neither 
recollected nor read from a primary source, nor yet mystically 
intuited. Rather, human societies tend to produce it socially on the 
bases of their productive powers and evolving needs (Ghassib, 1992). 
Thus, the genesis, existence, development and evolution of 
knowledge must be approached socio-historically. Admittedly, 
knowledge is rooted in the structure of the human brain, but it is 
rooted in it as a possibility, not as a direct actuality. In actuality, it is a 
socio-historical product, which starts and develops historically, and in 
relationship with the totality of human history. Social man produces 
knowledge as he produces his life and as he survives (Ghassib, 
1993;2011) This production of knowledge progresses as human 
society develops. Thus, knowledge has a history, within the context 
of the totality of human history. 
In this study, we wish to elaborate a theory of knowledge production 
dealing with the following points. As we intend to focus on exact 
science, we shall start by giving an operationally useful definition of 
exact science. Next, we shall give an account of the broad structure of 
the history of exact science. In particular, we shall divide the history 
of natural science into two broad eras: antique natural science and 
modern natural science. These two eras are separated by a transitional 
revolutionary era, which is commonly called the scientific revolution 
of the 17th century. This categorization will lead us to the concept of 
the knowledge industry. We shall offer a socio-economic historical 
explanation of the transformation of natural science from a minor 
marginal enterprise into a major industry. We shall then embark on a 
detailed explication of the components, mechanisms and specificities 
of the knowledge industry. 
 
Exact Science 
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When we use the term, exact science, we usually have in mind 
modern natural sciences-- in particular, physics, chemistry, 
astronomy, and geology. The essence of exact science is the 
dialectical relationship between mathematized theory and precise 
measurement, observation and experimentation. By a dialectical 
relationship, we mean an existential, necessary, transformational and 
contradictory relationship. Thus, exact science entails a specific way 
of theorization, which is mathematized in its very essence, and which 
can be concretized into a specific practice oriented towards precise 
measurement. 
 
From Antique to Modern Science  
Was exact science, in the sense outlined above, a modern European 
invention? Unfortunately, this erroneous view was the prevalent view 
in the West for a long time. It held that exact science was marginally 
born in ancient Greece, and later erupted in its totality in modern 
Europe. Modern scholarship in the history of science has shaken this 
erroneous idea to its core (Teresi, 2002). It has shown that the first 
truly exact science started in Babylon around the year 500 BC 
(Aaboe, 2001). That was Babylonian astronomy, which was 
characterized by a dialectical relationship between a very original 
form of numerical analysis and precise astronomical measurement. 
The next great instance of exact science was Greek astronomy, which 
started in the 2nd century BC by Hipparchus. Unlike Babylonian 
astronomy, it employed geometrical, rather than numerical analytic, 
methods. Hipparchus was of course influenced by Babylonian 
astronomy (Neugebauer, 1964), and his astronomy flourished in 
Egypt and the Near East, rather than in the West. It reached its Greek 
climax in Ptolemy in Alexandria in the 2nd century AD (Barbour, 
2001). This climax was revived in the 8th and 9th centuries AD. It 
was soon to be absorbed, updated and corrected by Arabic 
astronomers. In the tenth century AD, a critical movement of 
Ptolemaic astronomy started in both the Arab East and the Arab West 
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(Saliba, 1994; Saliba, 2007; Sabra, 1998). In subsequent centuries, 
Arabic astronomers attempted to construct alternative , but equally 
accurate, models, to the Ptolemaic models, more in accordance with 
Aristotelian principles. This movement lasted till the 16th century and 
beyond. Thus, Ptolemaic astronomy, which was a veritable exact 
science, reached its zenith in Arabic science. Another exact science 
started in Arabic civilization in the tenth century AD-- namely, 
Arabic optics (Rashed, 2003; Colic, 2007). The Arabic philosopher, 
Al-Kindi, Ibn Al-Sahl and Al-Hazen (Al-Hassan bin Al-Haitham) 
succeeded in turning the study of light into an exact science, whereby 
mathematical theorization was wedded to quantitative 
experimentation. One of its major fruits was the precise mathematical 
formulation of the sine law of refraction by Ibn Al-Sahl (Rashed, 
2003). This law was later wrongly attributed to Snell and Descartes. 
However, prior to the modern era, exact science failed to become 
universal. That is, it failed to penetrate major areas of nature, such as 
the motion of material bodies, the constitution of matter and 
cosmology. The latter remained chained to unscientific, inexact, 
metaphysical methods. The prevailing methodology of natural 
knowledge was Aristotelian logico-metaphysical methodology, which 
was quintessentially non-mathematical and non-experimental. It 
seems that the mathematical-cum-observational method was confined 
to pure ideal entities, such as light and celestial objects. Matter was 
considered too gross and ponderous to be treated mathematically. The 
essence of the Aristotelian logico-metaphysical method was 
emphasizing the reality of first metaphysical principles on the one 
hand, and the senses on the other, whilst establishing a syllogistic 
bridge between these two ontological realms (Shea, 1972). Other non-
scientific methods were also employed in pre-modern cultures, such 
as Pythagoreanism, Gnosticism, Mysticism, Hermeticism, Magic, 
Alchemy and Astrology. Thus, in pre-modern cultures, exact science 
was marginal and limited to a number of pockets dispersed into a sea 
of non-scientific methodologies. They failed to expand at the expense 
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of their surrounding. This ultimately led to their contraction and the 
liquidation of the whole knowledge production enterprise in Arabic 
culture in particular. In pre-modern cultures, the production of 
knowledge was characterized by the following general traits:  
 
1- It was a small enterprise compared to other sectors, such as the 
agricultural, commercial, handicraft, religious and military sectors, in 
terms of the size of investment and the number of its practitioners. 
The number of professional knowledge producers was minuscule 
compared to the huge number of peasants, traders, handicraftsmen 
and soldiers. 
2- Its impact on the economy was almost non-existent, compared to 
the other economic sectors. 
3- It had a guild-like organization. 
4- As stated previously, it was limited in extent and marginal in 
effect. 
5- It lacked self-autonomy, in that it was subjected to external-- 
religious and political-- authority in its very content. Its ultimate 
reference point was not scientific reason, but revelation.  
In the 17th century, a momentous intellectual revolution occurred, 
which turned everything upside down, and broke all the confining 
limits of antique science (Kuhn, 1959; Koestler, 1959; Koyre, 1973; 
Margolis, 2002). In particular, Galileo succeeded in extending the 
Archimedean mathematical method, which had been so successful in 
astronomy and optics, to the motion of bodies (Machamer, 1998). He 
invented a new method-- some sort of a Platonic empirical method-- 
which enabled him to mathematize nature (Drake, 1991). At the same 
time, Kepler succeeded in inventing a new (admittedly, a crude) field 
physics to celestial phenomena, which enabled him to discover the 
correct laws of planetary motion (Stephenson, 1987). Following these 
two giants of the scientific revolution, Descartes laid down a 
materialist ontology for modern science (Descartes, 1969). Newton 
was to unify all that into a grand mathematical engine for producing 
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and organizing natural knowledge (Bernard Cohen, 1980) These 
revolutionary events generated modern natural science. It was 
basically a comprehensive critical campaign, which volcanically 
extended the limited pockets of exact science at the expense of the 
metaphysical problematic that had prevailed. Whereas in pre-modern 
cultures, the pockets co-existed with the metaphysical bulk, in 
modern culture, the pockets exploded and destroyed the metaphysical 
bulk. It led to the invention of a new science (Bernard Cohen, 1968). 
which came to replace antique science entirely. The consequences 
were truly enormous. The new science led to a new technology and a 
new mode of production. It was seminal in transforming the nature 
and tempo of technology and material production. Without the new 
science, both the technological and the industrial revolutions would 
not have been possible. The scientific revolution ultimately 
transformed knowledge production from a marginal craft into a 
major, if not the major, industry in the modern world. Thus, 
compared to antique science, modern science has acquired the 
following general traits: 
1- It has become a central enterprise. 
2- It has become an industry, and probably the largest industry to 
boot. It is certainly one of the largest industries, if not the largest, in 
terms of the amount of investment and the number of employees in it, 
not to mention the quality of its employees. 
3- It has become vital for the modern economy. That is, it is not a 
mere industry amongst equally important others, but has acquired the 
status of a strategic industry, just like oil and the arms industry. 
4- It has receded from its previous guild-like form and become 
industrially structured. 
5- It has acquired a noticeable degree of self-autonomy. It is no 
longer affiliated to any religious or political authority. It does not 
recognize any external authority. The only authority it recognizes is 
internal to itself-- namely, scientific reasoning or scientific reason. 
6- In pre-modern cultures, science was guided by metaphysics and 
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theology. In modern culture, the opposite relationship prevails; 
philosophy and theology are guided by science.  
In short, for millennia, science was either non-existent or marginal. In 
the last two or three centuries, it has been transformed into a central 
concern, into one of the largest handful of industries. This is very 
peculiar. Why has this gigantic transformation occurred? What has 
happened in the last few centuries to nullify the lull that lasted for 
millennia? How can we explain this great upheaval?  
 
Towards A Political Economy Of Knowledge Production  
We attribute the relatively recent emergence of the knowledge 
industry, or of knowledge as an industry, to certain distinguishing 
features of the modern age, and the modern economy in particular. 
These distinguishing features, which truly distinguish the modern 
economy from all past forms and modes of economic production, 
have demanded allotting knowledge a central place in modern 
society. We particularly identify the following two new features of 
modernity, which offer a satisfactory explanation of the emergence of 
the knowledge industry. 
First, an essential feature of the capitalist mode of production is that it 
cannot survive and persist if it does not constantly revolutionize the 
implements of labour-- that is, the means of production, exchange, 
distribution, communication, transport, defense and aggression. In 
other words, a continually changing and rapidly developing 
technology is necessary for the reproduction of the modern economy. 
This was not the case in pre-modern economies, which tended to be 
conservative, and to uphold tradition at the expense of change. 
Thus, pre-modern technology, which was based on intuitive, practical 
life knowledge-- the knowledge of the carpenter, sailor, blacksmith, 
hunter and peasant-- tended to be static, and accorded perfectly with 
the conservative essence of pre-modern economies. However, 
capitalism has demanded right from the start an altogether different 
technology, a rapidly developing technology in a state of permanent 
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revolution (Marx, 1973). Such a technology cannot be based on 
practical life acquaintance. It can only be based on a universal 
extended science-- that is, on the ever expanding knowledge of causal 
principles and their effects. Such a technology can only be a practical 
embodiment of a knowledge industry, a central scientific enterprise. 
This means that the persistence of the modern economy and its 
expanded reproduction require a huge knowledge industry. 
Second, unlike pre-capitalist formations, the modern economy is not 
geared towards the satisfaction of fixed needs, but towards the 
generation of new needs. Since it is profit oriented, it feeds and 
reproduces itself via need generation. The sustainability of profit 
making requires need generation. The leading need generator in the 
modern economy is the knowledge industry. Thus, the very essence 
of the modern economy requires the scientific enterprise. The latter is 
the motive force of the former. In short, modern capitalism created 
the knowledge industry, because the latter is necessary for its survival 
and reproduction. 
 
The Components and Mechanisms of the Knowledge Industry  
Being an industry, the knowledge industry can be analyzed and 
understood in terms of the general form and structure of industries. 
Like other industries, it consists of sites of production, producers, 
instruments of production, raw materials, methods of production, 
products and objects of production. Let us concretely analyze each of 
these components and locate the specificities of the knowledge 
industry within this context. 
1- Sites of Knowledge Production, or Knowledge Factories: 
The main sites of knowledge production are universities, research 
institutes and research units within companies and enterprises. The 
last hundred years have witnessed an exponential growth of these 
knowledge factories in terms of their number and sizes. At the 
beginning of the 20th century, research institutes were almost non-
existent (Kragh, 2002), and universities were very limited in number 
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and size. Yet, by the end of that century, the number of universities 
and research institutions has risen to tens of thousands, and their sizes 
have grown many times over, with a concomitant growth in budgets. 
The growth has been stunning indeed. 
2- The Knowledge Producers: 
 The knowledge producers are principally a network of highly trained 
minds called scientists. They are supported by an army of 
administrators, engineers and technicians, but they are the direct 
producers. They are trained to deal with the raw material of 
knowledge, work with it and on it, and transform it into new 
knowledge. Knowledge is produced by teams of scientists within the 
context of a scientific community or institutional network. Thus, 
scientists are trained to deal with the raw material of knowledge, as 
well as to communicate with each other and with society at large. In 
this case, individual creativity is rooted in collective creativity, and 
conditioned by it. 
3- The Instruments of Knowledge Production: 
There are two broad classes of instruments of knowledge production: 
material implements and intellectual implements. Under the former, 
we list labs, mechanical and electronic devices, computers, 
calculators, softwares and suchlike. Under the latter, we list 
mathematical techniques, logical methods, and philosophical ideas. 
Scientists use such instruments creatively to work on, and with, the 
raw material of knowledge production. 
4- The Raw Material of Knowledge Production: 
The raw material of knowledge production is knowledge itself. To be 
more precise, it is the epistemic heritage of the scientific community. 
The epistemic heritage is a historically conditioned body of concepts, 
ideas, experimental, mathematical and logical techniques, theories, 
hypotheses, conjectures, philosophical ideas, experimental and 
observational facts and data, problematics, and practices recognized 
by the scientific community as its field of action and thought. At no 
time can the epistemic heritage be considered a logical whole, a 
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wholly logically coherent structure a la Euclidean geometry, for 
instance. It aspires to become a theory of everything (Weinberg, 
1993), or a wholly coherent logical edifice. This quest animates its 
progress. However, in actuality, it is a logically and conceptually 
inhomogeneous body of thought and practices, ridden with 
contradictions, absences, defects, uncertainties, problems, 
ungrounded conjectures and incoherencies. The scientist works with 
this complex body and on it, and interacts with the object of 
knowledge with it, in order, to solve its problems, resolve its 
contradictions, fill in its absences, remove its defects, increase its 
body of evidence, ground its conjectures, confirm its hypotheses, 
establish deeper connections and unify its seemingly unrelated 
elements. This is the basic mechanism, whereby the epistemic 
heritage develops, progresses and approaches the ideal of logical 
coherence. 
5- The Object of Knowledge: 
The epistemic heritage is not a closed universe, a closed whole. It is 
not some sort of a universal Hegelian Reason animated and evolving 
under the pressure of its internal contradictions (Hegel, 1977). Rather, 
it is more of an open totality constantly interacting with the object of 
knowledge via scientific practice, scientists' practices. Thus, the 
epistemic heritage is necessarily intentional. It is an open curve, that 
is closed, not in itself, but by the object of knowledge. It is 
necessarily constantly oriented towards the object of knowledge. It is 
concerned with such an object. Knowledge is ultimately produced by 
the systematic interaction of a scientific community with the object of 
knowledge. The former does not interact with the latter directly, but, 
rather, via and with the epistemic heritage. This means that the 
epistemic heritage does not develop merely under the pressure of its 
constant internal contradictions, but, rather, under the pressure of its 
varying internal and external contradictions. Its interaction with its 
object of knowledge feeds, as it were, its internal contradictions, 
moves them forward, and develops them further. The motive forces 
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that animate the epistemic heritage are scientific practice in itself and 
its systematic interaction with the object of knowledge. This is indeed 
the dialectic of scientific development (Ghassib, 1988). In the case of 
physics, the object of knowledge is nature, or the universe. In the case 
of the social sciences, it is human society. The relationship between 
the epistemic heritage and the object of knowledge constitutes its axis 
of significance and meaning. 
6- The End Product of Knowledge Production:  
The very special specificity of the production of knowledge resides 
precisely in the peculiarity of its end product. The latter differs from 
other industrial products in two unique characteristics. First, the 
process of evaluation of the end product is an integral part of the 
production process itself. The end product is a mere potentiality until 
it is subjected to evaluation by the scientific community. The 
potential can only turn into the actual via a strict process of 
evaluation. The latter is a necessary component of the value of an end 
product of knowledge production. Without it, the value of the end 
product is not realized. If the evaluation is negative, the end product 
is considered worthless-- that is, it is not incorporated into the 
epistemic heritage, and is not considered a real end product of 
scientific practice-- even if the knowledge producers have spent years 
on its production. That explains why promotion criteria tend to 
emphasize scientific works published in internationally recognized 
journals, and why scientists aspire to publish their work in such 
journals. 
Second, the end product of knowledge production is necessarily and 
intrinsically unenvisageable a priori. In conventional industries, the 
end product is envisageable beforehand. We know beforehand the 
type of end product we are aiming at. In fact, the method and process 
of production in this case is determined by this prior vision. The latter 
is translated beforehand into a set of pre-determined steps. However, 
in the case of the knowledge industry, this cannot possibly be done. A 
new end product cannot possibly be known a priori. Otherwise, it 
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would fail to constitute a new end product. If the knowledge end 
product is to be genuinely new and original, then it cannot possibly be 
envisageable beforehand. It may sometimes be anticipated, but it 
cannot be fixed beforehand. This is the only type of industrial product 
that bears this peculiar characteristic. 
7- The Methods of Knowledge Production:  
From the sixth component, it follows that, strictly speaking, there are 
no fixed prior methods of production in the scientific enterprise. We 
cannot translate scientific practice into a set of pre-ordained, pre-
determined, assembly-line-like steps. Scientific production is never 
purely routine work. It is intrinsically creative. It cannot be other than 
creative. Strictly speaking, there is no scientific method. This is a 
myth concocted by some philosophers. There is an infinite variety of 
scientific methods. Every major scientist creates his own method. 
Every major discovery and theoretical breakthrough requires a 
methodological innovation. Methodology is our key to unlock the 
secrets of nature. However, every secret requires its own key. A 
specific method may be suitable for a particular discovery, but it may 
not be so for another. In a sense, methodology is the other side of 
theory. It is the active side of theory. Every method has its limit. Once 
this limit is reached, transcending the prevailing method becomes a 
necessity. In science, methods are constantly being modified, 
overthrown and invented. Of course, scientific methods are inter-
related. After all, scientists learn their methods from each other. 
However, as they progress in their problem-solving work, they are 
impelled to modify or transcend the method they have learnt. Thus, 
scientific methods evolve. Some sort of a natural selection process is 
at work here. The so-called scientific method is an organism that 
evolves. 
 
Conclusion and Prospects 
In this paper, we have introduced the concept of the knowledge 
industry, suggested a mechanism for its genesis and emergence, 
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grounded this mechanism in the general march of history, particularly 
in socio-economic processes, and elaborated a productivist model of 
knowledge detailing the main components and mechanisms of the 
knowledge industry. Two fundamental questions arise from this 
elaboration. First, if there is an infinite variety of scientific methods, 
can we demarcate scientific practice from other social practices, 
including artistic, philosophical, religious, magical, astrological, 
alchemical, and mystical practices? If so, how? In a subsequent paper, 
I will show how this can be done by exploring the concept of 
scientific reason and the epistemological, ontological, ethical and 
socio-educational grounds of scientific practice. The second question 
concerns the concept of creativity in science. If science is 
fundamentally a creative activity, how do we characterize this 
creativity? In a future publication, I will address this question, and 
propose a theory grounding individual creativity in what I call 
collective creativity. 
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